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CY PRES SETTLEMENTS: PROBLEMS 
ASSOCIATED WITH THE JUDICIARY’S 
ROLE AND SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS 
Abstract: Class action settlements frequently generate funds that are never col-
lected by class members. This creates problems associated with determining how 
these funds should be allocated. This Note discusses one mechanism for distrib-
uting unclaimed settlement funds—cy pres distributions to charitable organiza-
tions that advance interests in line with those of the class members. This Note 
discusses two problems that arise out of the role judges play in cy pres distribu-
tions: the potential that judges will be perceived as making distributions to pet 
charities, and the potential that judges may transgress their constitutionally as-
signed role as arbiters of “cases or controversies” in making such distributions. 
This Note proposes solving these problems by removing judges from the process 
of allocating unclaimed class action settlement funds altogether, instead requiring 
parties to stipulate the treatment of such funds in any settlement agreement. 
INTRODUCTION 
Class action lawsuits are a common means of resolving a large number of 
claims in a single proceeding.1 Issues relating to settling class action lawsuits 
are frequently litigated due to the high stakes nature of class action litigation 
and the complexity of many class action settlements.2 
Recently, courts have grappled with issues surrounding the distribution of 
unclaimed settlement funds in class action suits.3 Sometimes excess funds re-
                                                                                                                           
 1 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (providing that one or more members of a class may sue on behalf of all 
members of a class if certain conditions are met); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 
2550 (2011) (noting that the class action is an exception to the usual rule that litigation is conducted 
by and on behalf of an individual named party); see also Brian T. Fitzpatrick, An Empirical Study of 
Class Action Settlements and Their Fee Awards, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 811, 811–12 (2010), 
available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/litigation/materials/2012_
aba_annual/12_6.authcheckdam.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/YN3H-5B6A (concluding that feder-
al district court judges approved 688 class action settlements involving $33 billion dollars from 2006 
to 2007).  
 2 See, e.g., Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 696 F.3d 811, 816 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that the district 
court did not abuse its discretion in approving a settlement over the objection of dissenting class 
members); Klier v. Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc., 658 F.3d 468, 471 (5th Cir. 2011) (holding that the 
district court abused its discretion in awarding unused class action settlement funds to charitable or-
ganizations rather than to class members); Mirfasihi v. Fleet Mortg. Corp., 356 F.3d 781, 782 (7th Cir. 
2004) (Posner, J. opinion) (holding that the district court abused its discretion in approving a settle-
ment where one sub-class of individuals received no direct compensation).  
 3 See, e.g., In re Lupron Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 677 F.3d 21, 35 (1st Cir. 2012) (holding 
that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding unclaimed settlement funds to a group 
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main in a settlement pool after class members have been compensated.4 Other 
times, distribution to class members is economically infeasible because trans-
action costs associated with distribution substantially outweigh the compensa-
tion individual class members are entitled to receive.5 In these situations, the 
parties and courts must determine how to distribute the settlement funds that 
remain uncollected.6 
To resolve these problems, parties to class action lawsuits and courts have 
begun distributing uncollected settlement funds to charitable organizations.7 
This action is commonly referred to as a “cy pres” distribution.8 The idea is 
that when direct distribution is impossible or infeasible because class members 
cannot be located or transaction costs outweigh potential recovery, distribution 
to charitable organizations provides the next best benefit to class members.9 
Recently, courts and commentators have raised questions about the use of 
cy pres distributions in class action settlements.10 Courts and commentators 
                                                                                                                           
researching diseases afflicting class members); In re Airline Ticket Comm’n Antitrust Litig., 307 F.3d 
679, 690 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding that the district court failed to distribute unclaimed settlement funds 
to a qualified recipient). See generally Martin H. Redish et al., Cy Pres Relief and the Pathologies of 
the Modern Class Action: A Normative and Empirical Analysis, 62 FLA. L. REV. 617 (2010) (discuss-
ing constitutional issues surrounding a commonly used mechanism—cy pres distributions—for dis-
tributing unclaimed class action settlement funds). 
 4 See In re Baby Prods. Antitrust Litig., 708 F.3d 163, 172 (3d Cir. 2013) (noting that a portion of 
settlement funds frequently remain unclaimed after distribution to class members and discussing pos-
sible mechanisms for allocating these funds). 
 5 See Lane, 696 F.3d at 819 (noting that the costs associated with distributing unclaimed settle-
ment funds can often exceed the pool of unclaimed funds available for distribution). 
 6 See In re Baby Prods., 708 F.3d at 172 (explaining that courts faced with unclaimed settlement 
funds have four principle options for distributing unclaimed settlement funds: further pro rata distribu-
tion to class members, reversion to the defendant, escheat to the state, and cy pres distribution to a 
charitable organization). These four methods of distribution are discussed in more detail later in this 
Note. See infra notes 35–51 and accompanying text. 
 7 See In re Lupron, 677 F.3d at 24; Masters v. Wilhelmina Model Agency, Inc., 473 F.3d 423, 
432 (2d Cir. 2007); In re Airline Ticket Comm’n, 307 F.3d at 680. 
 8 See Masters, 473 F.3d at 436. 
 9 See id.; Klier, 658 F.3d at 474 (“In the class-action context, a cy pres distribution is designed to 
be a way for the court to put any unclaimed settlement funds to their ‘next best compensation use, e.g., 
for the aggregate, indirect, prospective benefit of the class.’”) (citation omitted). See generally Wilber 
H. Boies & Latonia Haney Keith, Class Action Settlement Residue and Cy Pres Awards: Emerging 
Problems and Practical Solutions, 21 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 267, 290 (2014) (advocating for use of 
cy pres distributions to organizations promoting access to justice as a mechanism to achieve a result 
that will benefit class members, all of whom have an interest in access to justice). 
 10 See Klier, 658 F.3d at 480–82 (Jones, J., concurring) (expressing concern about the constitu-
tionality of cy pres distributions, and suggesting that courts avoid the problems by returning excess 
funds to the defendant); Robert E. Draba, Note, Motorsports Merchandise: A Cy Pres Distribution 
Not Quite “As Near as Possible” 16 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 121, 124 (2004) (expressing concern 
about cy pres distributions to charitable organizations that do not advance interests closely mirroring 
the interests of the injured class members); Sam Yospe, Note, Cy Pres Distributions in Class Action 
Settlements, 2009 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1014, 1021 (arguing that discretion afforded to judges in 
making cy pres distributions often results in distributions that are arbitrary and unpredictable). 
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have suggested that the practice raises serious constitutional concerns.11 Fur-
ther, circuit courts are not in total agreement about the standards surrounding 
the use of cy pres distributions in the class action context.12 Finally, U.S. Su-
preme Court Chief Justice John Roberts has indicated that there are “funda-
mental concerns” surrounding the use of cy pres remedies in class action litiga-
tion.13  
This Note addresses problems relating to the proper role of the judiciary 
in shaping cy pres settlements and suggests solutions to these problems.14 Part 
I provides general background on class action litigation and the development 
of cy pres remedies in this context.15 Part II introduces and explains two major 
concerns about the proper role of judges in shaping a cy pres remedy, and ex-
amines how courts and commentators have responded to these concerns.16 Fi-
nally, Part III argues that these problems are best solved by removing judges 
from the process of allocating unclaimed settlement funds to charitable organi-
zations.17 
I. CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS AND CY PRES DISTRIBUTIONS 
Understanding the problem of cy pres distributions requires some back-
ground into class action lawsuits and the mechanism for distributions general-
ly.18 Section A examines class action lawsuits generally and the role of judges 
in approving class action settlements.19 Section B then explains cy pres settle-
ments as a means of accounting for excess settlement funds that are unclaimed 
by class members.20 
A. Class Action Settlement Generally 
Broadly speaking, Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is a 
procedural mechanism allowing for the aggregation of claims.21 Under this 
                                                                                                                           
 11 See Klier, 658 F.3d at 480–82 (Jones, J., concurring) (suggesting that cy pres distributions may 
violate Article III standing requirements); Redish et al., supra note 3, at 641 (outlining three major 
constitutional “pathologies” associated with cy pres distributions in the class action context). 
 12 Compare In re Baby Prods., 708 F.3d at 176 (requiring courts to estimate the value of plaintiff 
claims and compare that to direct distributions before approving cy pres distribution), with Lane, 696 
F.3d at 823 (affirming the district court’s approval of a cy pres remedy despite the lack of an evalua-
tion into the value of the plaintiff’s claims). 
 13 See Marek v. Lane, 134 S. Ct. 8, 9 (2013) (statement of Roberts, C.J.). 
 14 See infra notes 18–211 and accompanying text. 
 15 See infra notes 18–51 and accompanying text. 
 16 See infra notes 52–173 and accompanying text. 
 17 See infra notes 174–211 and accompanying text. 
18 See infra notes 21–51 and accompanying text. 
 19 Se infra notes 21–30 and accompanying text. 
 20 See infra notes 31–51 and accompanying text. 
 21 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1)–(4) (providing that one or more members of a class may sue or be 
sued on behalf of all members of that class if certain conditions are met). 
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Rule, individual plaintiffs can bring claims on behalf on themselves and all 
other individuals who have similar claims based on common questions of law 
or fact.22 The individuals for whom claims are brought (“class members”) are 
not actively involved in the litigation.23 Class members may be bound by a 
judgment or a settlement unless they affirmatively opt-out at the certification 
or settlement stage.24 
Since judgments and settlements may be binding on non-named class 
members, there are strict requirements for when a class action may be main-
tained.25 As an initial matter, the named plaintiff must show that: (1) the puta-
tive class is so numerous that a joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) 
there are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims of the 
named plaintiffs are representative of the claims of all class members; and (4) 
the named plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the un-
named class members.26 
 Judges play an important role in class action settlements because the 
court must approve all class action litigation settlements.27 This is because the 
settlement will be binding on all class members who did not opt-out, and class 
members who do not opt-out but are not actively involved in the litigation have 
little control over the terms of the settlement.28 Without a voice in the litiga-
tion, there is a risk that a class settlement will benefit other interests, like class 
counsel or the named class members, at the expense of unnamed class mem-
                                                                                                                           
 22 See id. 23(b)(3) (providing that a case may proceed on a class basis when common issues of 
law or fact predominate over any questions affecting individual class members); Sullivan v. DB Invs., 
Inc., 667 F.3d 273, 335 (3d Cir. 2011) (noting that the requirement that common questions of law or 
fact must predominate means that a determination of the truth or falsity of the common contention 
will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each of the claims in one stroke). 
 23 See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 175 (1974) (noting that, under Rule 23, un-
named class members who can be reasonably identified must be given notice of the action and the 
opportunity to opt out of the class proceeding so that they may preserve the opportunity to press their 
claims separately). See generally Debra Lyn Bassett, Just Go Away: Representation, Due Process, 
and Preclusion in Class Actions, 2009 BYU L. REV. 1079, 1087–88 (outlining the treatment of un-
named class members and the preclusive power of a judgment on such class unnamed class members). 
 24 See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 805 (1985) (noting that principles of res 
judicata must apply to unnamed class members if purposes of class action litigation are to be fulfilled 
because without res judicata, absent class members could pursue the defendant in other fora even after 
a final judgment). 
 25 See Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 157, 161 (1982) (holding that a class action 
may only be certified if the rigorous requirements of Rule 23(a) have been satisfied, and noting the 
potential risk of unfairness to class members bound by a judgment if these requirements are not met). 
 26 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1)–(4). 
 27 See id. 23(e) (providing that the claims or issues of a certified class may only be compromised 
with the approval of the court). 
 28 See Ehrheart v. Verizon Wireless, 609 F.3d 590, 592–93 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding that the pur-
pose of the Rule 23 requirement that a court approve a class action settlement is to protect the interests 
of the unnamed class members). 
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bers.29 To approve a class action settlement, the court must find that the settle-
ment is fair, reasonable, and adequate in the way in which it addresses the in-
terests of all those who will be affected by it.30 
B. Next Best Beneficiaries: Introduction to Cy Pres Settlements 
In many cases, funds remain in a settlement pool because class members 
fail to come forward to submit their claims.31 Often, the settlement agreement 
will provide for how excess funds should be allocated.32 But if the parties do 
not agree, the court must determine how to distribute the funds.33 Cy pres set-
tlements in class action lawsuits were originally pursued to allocate these re-
sidual funds.34 
Courts have traditionally adopted one of four methods to distribute un-
claimed settlement funds: (1) pro rata distribution to claiming class members; 
(2) escheat to a government body; (3) reversion to the defendant; or (4) cy pres 
distribution.35 Each of these arrangements has advantages and drawbacks.36 
                                                                                                                           
 29 Weinberger v. Great N. Nekoosa Corp., 925 F.2d 518, 524 (1st Cir. 1991) (noting that there is a 
danger that class counsel may negotiate a less than optimal settlement in exchange for preferential 
treatment on the payment of its fees). Because of this risk of inadequate representation by class coun-
sel or the named class members, the court approving the class action settlement must act as a fiduciary 
guarding the rights and claims of the unnamed class members. See In re AT&T Corp., 455 F.3d 160, 
175 (3d Cir. 2006). 
 30 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2); Rodriquez v. W. Publ’g Corp., 563 F.3d 948, 963 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(holding that, in considering whether a class action settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate, a 
district court may consider several factors, including but not limited to the strength of the plaintiff’s 
case, the extent of discovery conducted, the amount to be received by class members, and the class 
members’ reaction to the settlement). 
 31 See Yospe, supra note 10, at 1015–16 (providing an outline of the various reasons why funds 
may remain in a settlement pool after distributions to class members who have submitted claims). 
 32 See id. (noting that parties often agree on how to allocate settlement funds). 
 33 See Naschin v. AOL, LLC, 663 F.3d 1034, 1038 (9th Cir. 2011) (noting that the cy pres doc-
trine allows courts to distribute excess settlement funds in a way that provides some indirect benefit to 
the class members); see also Jennifer Johnston, Comment, Cy Pres Comme Possible to Anything Is 
Possible: How Cy Pres Creates Improper Incentives in Class Action Settlements, 9 J.L. ECON. & 
POL’Y 277, 277–78 (2013) (noting that concerns about the extent of judicial discretion inherent in the 
application of the cy pres doctrine originated in early English law and continue today). 
 34 See Naschin, 663 F.3d at 1036 (citing Six Mexican Workers v. Ariz. Citrus Growers, 904 F.2d 
1301, 1307–08 (9th Cir. 1990)) (holding that the cy pres doctrine allows courts to distribute unclaimed 
or non-distributable portions of settlement funds to the “next best” beneficiaries). See generally Tim 
A. Thomas, Annotation, Permissible Methods of Distributing Unclaimed Damages in Federal Class 
Action, 107 A.L.R. FED. 800 (1992) (outlining and evaluating cases in which courts have utilized or 
declined to utilize the cy pres remedy to distribute unclaimed or non-distributable settlement funds). 
 35 See Diamond Chem. Co. v. Akzo Nobel Chems. B.V., 517 F. Supp. 2d 212, 217 (D.D.C. 2007) 
(citing Powell v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 843 F. Supp. 491, 495 (W.D. Ark. 1991)). When courts dis-
pose of excess funds with further distribution to class members, whatever funds are left over will be 
transferred on a pro rata basis to class members who have already collected. See In re Lupron, 677 
F.3d at 35 (citing Klier, 658 F. 3d at 475 (noting that where it is still economically and logistically 
impossible to make further pro rata distributions to class members, the settlement court should do so)). 
When escheat is employed, the remaining funds are transferred to the government, the idea being that 
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Pro rata distribution to already compensated class members increases the total 
amount distributed to class members, but could result in a windfall to those 
class members who collect over one hundred percent of their damages at the 
expense of other class members who did not or could not collect their compen-
sation for whatever reason.37 Some defendants argue that unclaimed funds 
should revert to them on the basis that the prospect of reversion might motivate 
them to provide a greater settlement, knowing that they may receive some 
money back.38 But funds that revert to the defendant provide no benefit, either 
direct or indirect, to the class members.39 Similarly, there is no direct benefit to 
class members when unclaimed funds escheat to the government, and any indi-
rect benefit is tenuous.40  
Because none of the above-mentioned options are particularly attractive, 
courts have increasingly sought to allocate excess funds to charitable organiza-
tions through cy pres distributions.41 The policy rational behind the use of cy 
                                                                                                                           
the government’s use of the money will benefit the entire country and will consequently bring some 
benefit to class members. See In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litig., 744 F.2d 1252, 1255 (7th Cir. 
1984) (holding that the district court’s decision to use excess settlement funds for a cy pres distribu-
tion was an abuse of discretion and directing that the funds escheat to the United States). It should be 
noted that certain statutory requirements must be met for any funds deposited in the judicial system to 
escheat to the government. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2041, 2042 (2012) (requiring that funds remain un-
claimed for more than five years before they escheat to the United States). Reversion simply means 
that any unclaimed funds will be transferred back to the class action defendant. See In re Motorsports 
Merch. Antitrust Litig., 160 F. Supp. 2d 1392, 1395 (N.D. Ga. 2001) (noting that often reversion to 
the defendant is disfavored because the defendant has already conceded to the full amount offered in 
the settlement). 
 36 See infra notes 37–40 and accompanying text (discussing the advantages and drawbacks to 
each of the four methods of distributing remaining class action settlement funds). 
 37 See In re Lupron, 677 F.3d at 35; Klier, 658 F.3d at 475. The potential for such windfalls has 
encouraged many courts to allow for further pro rata distribution of excess funds only when it is eco-
nomically and logistically feasible and when such distribution would not result in a windfall to class 
members who have already recovered one hundred percent of their actual damages. See Klier, 658 
F.3d at 475. But see PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 3.07 cmt. b (2010) (not-
ing that when further distribution to class members is logistically and economically feasible it is al-
most always preferable to a cy pres distribution because the risk of windfall associated with further 
pro rata distribution is insignificant in practice, given that class members almost never recover one 
hundred percent of their actual damages). 
 38 See Redish et al., supra note 3, at 638. 
 39 See id.  
 40 See id.  
 41 See, e.g., Lane, 696 F.3d at 816 (approving a cy pres distribution in lieu of direct distribution 
when direct distribution would have been economically infeasible because the cost of distribution 
surpassed amount available for distribution); In re Lupron, 677 F.3d at 37 (holding that district court 
did not abuse its discretion in directing excess settlement funds to hospitals engaged in research into 
the same medical conditions afflicting class members). The practice of using funds that cannot go 
directly to the intended beneficiary has its roots in trust law. See Mirfasihi, 356 F.3d at 784 (noting 
that in trust law the cy pres doctrine is invoked when distribution under the trust is impracticable or 
impossible under the principle that the settlor would prefer an indirect benefit of distribution to a ben-
eficiary as close as possible to the intended beneficiary rather than a reversion to the settlor’s residual 
legatees). Interestingly, in trust law the doctrine was invoked to provide an indirect benefit to the 
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pres in class action suits is that application of the doctrine provides the “next 
best” compensation to class members.42 The idea is that if class members can-
not benefit from a settlement through direct distributions, then the next best 
benefit to the class members would be achieved by distributing the funds to a 
charitable organization.43 
Of course, not any charitable organization will serve to provide the next 
best aggregate, indirect, and prospective benefit to class members.44 For exam-
ple, directing funds arising out of a settlement of a pharmaceutical industry 
antitrust case to an organization providing low cost housing to law students 
would do little to benefit uncompensated class members.45 As such, courts re-
viewing cy pres distributions require the charitable organization to advance 
interests that bear a “substantial nexus” to the interests of the uncompensated 
class members.46 This requirement is designed to ensure that the funds directed 
to the cy pres recipient will provide some benefit the injured class members.47 
                                                                                                                           
settlor—by equitably altering the terms of the trust so as to carry out the settlor’s intentions as best as 
possible—rather than to provide an indirect benefit to the beneficiaries who could not receive distribu-
tion. See id. 
 42 See Dennis v. Kellogg Co., 697 F.3d 858, 865 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Six Mexican Workers, 904 
F.3d at 1305 (holding that a cy pres award must qualify as the “next best” distribution to giving the 
funds directly to class members)); Masters, 473 F.3d at 436 (holding that the purpose of a cy pres 
distribution is to put the settlement funds to its next best use—the aggregate, indirect, and prospective 
benefit of the class members). 
 43 See Lane, 696 F.3d at 821. But see Mirfasihi, 356 F.3d at 784 (asserting that there is no indirect 
benefit to class members by giving funds to a third party, and that the cy pres remedy is purely puni-
tive because the only reason for applying it is to prevent the defendant from “walking away from the 
litigation scot-free”). 
 44 See In re Lupron, 677 F.3d at 33 (holding that a charitable organization must advance interests 
that reasonably approximate the interest of the uncompensated class members to qualify as a cy pres 
distribution recipient); Lane, 696 F.3d at 821 (holding that a district court cannot approve a cy pres 
distribution unless the recipient bears a “substantial nexus” to the interests of the class members, ac-
counting for the nature of the plaintiff’s suit, the objectives of any statutes underlying the plaintiff’s 
claims, and the interests of the silent class members). 
 45 See In re Airline Ticket Comm’n, 307 F.3d at 682 (holding that unclaimed settlement funds 
should be distributed for a purpose as near as possible to the legitimate objectives underlying the law-
suit and the interests of the class members). Using excess settlement funds from a pharmaceutical 
antitrust case to subsidize law student housing would not provide the “next best” benefit because ad-
vancing law student housing opportunities is not an objective underlying a pharmaceutical industry 
antitrust case. See id. 
 46 See In re Lupron, 677 F.3d at 33 (holding that a charitable organization must advance interests 
that reasonably approximate the interest of the uncompensated class members to qualify as a cy pres 
distribution recipient).  
 47 See Naschin, 663 F.3d at 1040. In Naschin v. AOL, LLC, the court rejected a cy pres distribu-
tion in an unfair trade practices case. See id. The court reasoned that the charitable organizations re-
ceiving distributions—the Boys and Girls Club and a Legal Aid foundation—did not adequately ap-
proximate the interests of the class members. Id. This was because the cy pres recipients were concen-
trated in Southern California and the class members were spread across the entire country. Id.; cf. Six 
Mexican Workers, 904 F.2d at 1308 (holding that district court’s cy pres distribution was an abuse of 
discretion because there was no reasonable certainty that any class members—Mexican workers who 
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Cy pres distributions for funds remaining in the settlement pool have signif-
icant advantages over other mechanisms for distributing excess settlement 
funds.48 Unlike pro rata distribution of excess funds, cy pres distributions result 
in no undue windfall to plaintiffs who do collect.49 Similarly, unlike a reversion 
to the defendant, cy pres distribution does not winnow the deterrence effect as-
sociated with the defendant having to pay for injury underlying the plaintiff’s 
claims.50 And unlike escheat, cy pres distribution of excess funds creates the po-
tential for the funds to more directly benefit to the class members.51 
II. THE GENEROUS JUDICIARY: PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED  
WITH CY PRES DISTRIBUTIONS 
 Concerns about the role of the judiciary in shaping cy pres settlements 
arise from the fact that cy pres settlements force federal judges into an unfa-
miliar role: selecting one of several equally meritorious charitable organiza-
tions for receipt of a cy pres award.52 Courts and commentators have expressed 
concerns about putting judges into the role of deciding whether certain non-
profit entities are more or less “deserving” of limited cy pres funds than oth-
                                                                                                                           
were the victims of unscrupulous employers in the United States—would benefit from the works ad-
vanced by the charitable organization, which provided humanitarian relief in Mexico). 
 48 See Albert A. Foer, Enhancing Competition Through the Cy Pres Remedy: Suggested Best 
Practices, ANTITRUST MAG., Spring 2010, at 87, 87–88 (arguing that in the context of class action 
antitrust litigation, cy pres distributions should be favored to other distribution mechanisms for excess 
funds because the funds can be directed to organizations that combat anticompetitive conduct that 
deprived class members of an efficiently functioning market). 
 49 See Klier, 658 F.3d at 475 (noting that the pro rata distribution of settlement funds to class 
members who have already been compensated can create an undue windfall by allowing some class 
members to collect more than one hundred percent of their actual damages, which can be avoided by 
using a cy pres distribution to allocate the excess funds to an organization that will provide some indi-
rect benefit to uncompensated class members). 
 50 Six Mexican Workers, 904 F.2d at 1308 (noting that reversion to the defendant is inappropriate 
when the goals underlying the plaintiffs’ claims include deterrence of similar future unlawful con-
duct). Unlike with reversion, when settlement funds are distributed through a cy pres remedy, the 
defendant feels the full economic consequences of its unlawful action because it gets none of the set-
tlement or judgment back. See Mirfasihi, 356 F.3d at 784 (asserting that a cy pres remedy is purely 
punitive). 
 51 Compare 28 U.S.C. § 2042 (2012) (providing no requirements that government use excess 
settlement funds obtained by escheat for the direct or indirect benefit of uncompensated class mem-
bers), with Dennis, 697 F.3d at 865 (requiring that cy pres distribution go to charitable organizations 
that have a substantial nexus to the plaintiffs’ interests). 
 52 See In re Lupron Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 677 F.3d 21, 38 (1st Cir. 2012) (noting that a 
distribution of funds at the discretion of the court is not a traditional Article III function); In re Com-
pact Disk Minimum Advertised Price Antitrust Litig., 236 F.R.D. 48, 53 (D. Me. 2006) (“Federal 
Judges are not generally equipped to be charitable foundations: [they] are not accountable to boards or 
members for the funding decisions [they] make; [they] are not accustomed to deciding whether certain 
nonprofit entities are more ‘deserving’ of limited funds than others; and [they] do not have the institu-
tional resources and competencies to monitor that ‘grantees’ abide by the conditions [they] or the 
settlement agreements set.”). 
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ers.53 In particular, Chief Justice John Roberts has expressed concerns about 
the respective roles that judges and litigants currently play in shaping cy pres 
remedies.54 
This Part discusses some of the criticisms of cy pres distributions and ex-
amines proposed remedies to these problems.55 Section A discusses a constitu-
tional concern arising out of the fact that cy pres settlements may violate Arti-
cle III standing requirements.56 Section B then examines concerns about the 
potential for the appearance of impropriety inherent in granting judges the dis-
cretion to distribute large sums of money to charitable organizations.57 
A. Not a Case or Controversy: Standing and Separation of Power Concerns 
Underlying Cy Pres Distributions 
 Generally, federal litigation involves two adverse parties, one of whom 
is seeking redress for an injury from the other party.58 This is because Article 
III, section two of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to 
live cases and controversies.59 The rational underlying this limitation is the 
basic necessity for a separation of powers: the unrepresentative judicial branch 
should be limited to resolving disputes rather than forming and executing sub-
stantive policy decisions.60 
                                                                                                                           
 53 See e.g., In re Lupron, 677 F.3d at 37–38 (expressing concern that litigants vest district courts 
with discretion in selecting a recipient); Klier v. Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc., 658 F.3d 468, 481 (5th 
Cir. 2011) (Jones, J., concurring) (noting the potential for abuse or, at least, the potential for appear-
ances of impropriety, when judges dole out large sums of money); see also Goutam U. Jois, The Cy 
Pres Problem and the Role of Damages in Tort Law, 16 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 258, 260 (2008) (as-
serting that, given the wide range of cy pres beneficiaries, and the tenuous relationships they often 
bear to the interests of class members, the practice of cy pres distribution is more akin to legislative 
earmarking than judicial conflict resolution). 
 54 See Marek v. Lane, 134 S. Ct. 8, 9 (2013) (statement of Roberts, C.J.). 
 55 See infra notes 58–173 and accompanying text. 
 56 See infra notes 58–102 and accompanying text. 
 57 See infra notes 103–173 and accompanying text. 
 58 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (noting that the doctrine of 
standing, which requires a plaintiff to show “injury in fact,” is one of those landmarks that serves to 
identify disputes that are properly resolved through the judicial process); see also F. Andrew Hessick, 
Standing, Injury in Fact, and Private Rights, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 275, 275 (2008) (noting that the 
U.S. Supreme Court has used the injury in fact requirement to preserve the separation of powers by 
limiting courts to their traditional role of resolving individual rights). 
 59 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; see Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 317 (1988) (noting that Article III of 
the Constitution limits federal courts to deciding only actual ongoing controversies); see also Lewis v. 
Cont’l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 577 (1990) (holding that Article III denies federal courts the power 
“to decide questions that cannot affect the rights of the litigants in the case before them,” and restricts 
courts to resolving “real and substantial controversies admitting of specific relief”); Baker v. Carr, 369 
U.S. 186, 206 (1962) (noting that the requirements embodied by the doctrine of standing work to 
ensure that the litigants have such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy so that there will 
be sufficient adverseness to sharpen the presentation of the issues up for resolution). 
 60 See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984), abrogated on other grounds by Lexmark Int’l, 
Inc. v. Static Control Components, 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014) (citing Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. 
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Although the Constitution does not explicitly define what amounts to a 
“case” or a “controversy,” the U.S. Supreme Court has an established judicial 
doctrine defining when a court has the power to make binding decisions on 
parties.61 The requirements arising out of this case law are commonly referred 
to as “standing requirements,” which define when a litigant has standing to 
appear before a court.62 
To have standing before a federal court, a party must establish three ele-
ments.63 The first is that the party has suffered some “injury in fact”: an inva-
sion of a legally protected interest that is concrete and particularized, and “ac-
tual or imminent,” as in not hypothetical or conjectural.64 Second, the party 
must prove that there is a causal connection between the injury and the alleged 
conduct.65 This means that the injury must be fairly traceable to the challenged 
action of the defendant and not the result of independent action by some third 
party not before the court.66 Third, the party must show that it is “likely”—as 
opposed to “speculative”—that the injury will be redressed by a favorable de-
cision.67 If a party fails to establish any one of these factors, any adjudication 
by the court violates the dictates of the case or controversy requirement of the 
Constitution.68 
The issue with the current cy pres distribution framework is that potential 
cy pres award recipients do not meet the traditional requirements for Article III 
standing.69 They appear before the court, make arguments as to why they 
should receive a cy pres award, and have their plea decided upon by the judge, 
despite having suffered no injury and without complaining of harmful conduct 
                                                                                                                           
Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471–76 (1982) (explaining that the 
standing doctrine defines, with respect to the judicial branch, the idea of separation of powers on 
which the federal government is founded)); Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 
(1976) (holding that no principle is more fundamental to the limited role of the judicial branch than 
the case or controversy requirement); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975) (holding that the 
Article III “case or controversy” requirement, and the doctrine of standing to which it gives rise, are 
founded in concerns about maintaining the proper limited role of the judicial branch in a democratic 
society). 
 61 See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560; Allen, 468 U.S. at 751. 
 62 See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560; see also Heather Elliot, The Functions of Standing, 61 STAN. L. 
REV. 459, 465 (2008) (noting that the three requirements for standing arising out of the case law are 
so well established that they have been described as “numbingly familiar” by some commentators). 
 63 See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. 
 64 See id. 
 65 See id. 
 66 See Simon, 426 U.S. at 40–41. 
 67 See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561. 
 68 See Temple v. Abercrombie, 903 F. Supp. 2d 1024, 1030 (D. Haw. 2012) (citing Thomas v. 
Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 220 F.3d 1134, 1139 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc)) (holding that the 
Article III case or controversy requirement is not met if the plaintiffs lack standing, and that in such a 
case the federal court would lack subject matter jurisdiction). 
69 See infra notes 70–81 and accompanying text (outlining the argument that cy pres dis-
tributions fail to meet Article III standing requirements). 
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by any litigant or third party.70 By making the decision to distribute excess set-
tlement funds to a specific charitable organization, the court has not ruled upon 
any live case or controversy; rather, it has simply ordered that money be paid 
from the defendant to a party that is in no way adverse to it.71 
This lack of any adversarial relationship between the potential cy pres 
award recipient and the litigants necessary for standing may render this type of 
function beyond the court’s constitutional power.72 This is because the pres-
ence of an “honest and actual antagonistic assertion of rights” to be adjudicat-
ed is indispensable to the exercise of the power of the judicial branch.73 
Standing doctrine plays an important role in federal litigation—it works 
to ensure that the judicial branch does not encroach on other areas of govern-
ment.74 Further, cy pres beneficiaries—who arguably lack any standing—play 
a key role in the current cy pres distribution framework.75 The lack of standing 
inherent in a cy pres beneficiaries’ participation in the proceedings creates a 
                                                                                                                           
 70 See Klier, 658 F.3d at 480–81 (Jones, J., concurring) (noting that cy pres distributions “likely 
violate Article III’s standing requirements”); see also Redish et al., supra note 3, at 641 (arguing that 
introduction of the cy pres recipient into the proceeding transforms the adversarial dispute into a less 
than adversarial process in which the cy pres recipient participates but complains of no real injury in 
fact). 
 71 See Klier, 658 F.3d at 480–81 (Jones, J., concurring). Based on this Note’s survey of the case 
law and secondary literature, no court has specifically addressed the issue of whether a court’s deci-
sion to distribute excess settlement funds to a charitable organization results in a violation of the case 
or controversy requirement, and thus constitutes an act beyond the limited sphere of judicial power. 
See id. (noting that the issue of whether cy pres distributions are unconstitutional has not been fully 
litigated in any court and suggesting that district courts should avoid raising these questions by re-
fraining from making cy pres distributions). In fact, most courts simply assume that they retain full 
jurisdiction over any excess settlement funds and retain full equitable powers with respect to distribu-
tion. See In re Motorsports Merch. Antitrust Litig., 160 F. Supp. 2d 1392, 1393 (N.D. Ga. 2001) (cit-
ing In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litig., 744 F.2d 1252, 1254 (7th Cir. 1984)) (noting that when ex-
cess settlement funds remain, neither the defendant nor the class members have a legal claim to the 
funds and the court retains its equitable powers to distribute the funds). 
 72 See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94–95 (1968) (noting that strict adherence to the case and 
controversy requirement underlying the standing doctrine defines the role assigned to the judiciary in 
the tripartite allocation of power and works to ensure that the judicial branch does not intrude into 
other areas committed to other branches of the government). 
 73 See United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302, 305 (1943). 
 74 See Flast, 392 U.S. 83 at 94–95 (noting that strict adherence to the case and controversy re-
quirement underlying standing defines the role assigned to the judiciary in the constitutional balance 
of power). 
 75 See In re Lupron, 677 F.3d at 27 (noting that potential cy pres recipients prepared and submit-
ted competing proposals for use of excess settlement funds for the court to review). Although poten-
tial cy pres beneficiaries actively participate in the settlement proceedings, they not claim any actual 
injury in fact. See id. For this reason, the cy pres beneficiaries do not meet the black letter require-
ments for standing. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 559 (holding that, in order for a party petitioning the court 
to decide or resolve an issue, that party must claim some injury in fact). Because cy pres recipients 
lack standing, the court’s decision as to whether to make a cy pres distribution to that party is arguably 
beyond the sphere of Article III courts’ judicial power to resolve live cases or controversies. See Flast, 
392 U.S. at 94–95 (holding that strict adherence to the standing requirements works to ensure that the 
judicial branch does not encroach into areas of government reserved for other branches). 
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significant risk that the court lacks the constitutional authority to make deci-
sions as to which organizations deserve cy pres awards.76 Without a solution to 
this standing issue, the continued viability of these types of settlements may be 
called into question.77 
At first glance, it is hard to see how the current standing requirements and 
the current practice of allowing charitable entities to present themselves as po-
tential cy pres beneficiaries can co-exist.78 There is no way to get around the 
fact that cy pres beneficiaries have not suffered an “injury in fact” and thus 
cannot be considered to have standing in the traditional sense.79 It is equally 
clear, however, that under the current cy pres distribution framework cy pres 
beneficiaries play an important role: they present themselves to the court and 
thus give the court viable options for distribution of funds.80 Some resolution 
of this issue is necessary for the continued viability of the current cy pres dis-
tribution framework.81 
                                                                                                                           
 76 See supra note 72–73 and accompanying text (discussing the fact that potential cy pres recipi-
ents lack standing because they have suffered no injury in fact, and in turn that the court does not rule 
on a live case or controversy when making cy pres distributions). 
 77 See Klier, 658 F.3d at 480–81 (Jones, J., concurring) (questioning the constitutionality of cy 
pres distributions based on, among other things, the lack of standing by cy pres beneficiaries partici-
pating in the litigation); see also Redish et al., supra note 3, at 624 (arguing that the constitutional 
difficulties associated with the current cy pres distribution framework are sufficiently problematic to 
justify abandoning the practice of cy pres distribution in class action litigation entirely). 
 78 Compare Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (requiring that a party present a concrete and particular inva-
sion of a legally protected interest in order for the court to have jurisdiction to hear that party’s peti-
tion), with In re Lupron, 677 F.3d at 27 (noting that the district court considered proposals submitted 
by two entirely uninjured charities and eventually selected one of these charities based on the pro-
posals). See generally Redish et al., supra note 3 (arguing that the standing issue surrounding cy pres 
recipients, along with other concerns, is sufficient grounds to entirely abandon the practice of cy pres 
distributions). 
 79 See Baker, 369 U.S. at 206 (noting that the requirements embodied by the doctrine of standing 
work to ensure that the litigants have such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy that 
there will be sufficient adverseness to sharpen the presentation of the issues up for resolution). Based 
on the idea that one policy underlying standing is to ensure that the parties have a sufficient personal 
stake in the outcome, one could argue that standing exists because cy pres recipients are often in com-
petition, and submit competing proposals, for the same distribution. Cf. Yospe, supra note 10, at 1049 
(arguing that one way to limit the amount of discretion afforded to judges would be to make cy pres 
distributions in the context of competing proposals between potential recipients). 
 80 See In re Lupron, 677 F.3d at 27–28 (detailing how a cy pres recipient presented itself to the 
court and submitted a proposal as to why it should receive funds). But see In re Motorsports, 160 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1398 (noting how the court unilaterally selected cy pres beneficiaries). Cy pres recipients 
often present themselves to the court and are active participants, but sometimes they have no involve-
ment in the proceedings. See In re Lupron, 677 F.3d at 27–28; In re Motorsports, 160 F. Supp. 2d at 
1398. 
 81 See Klier, 658 F.3d at 480–82 (Jones, J., concurring) (expressing concern about the constitu-
tionality of the current cy pres distribution framework, and noting that as of yet the issue has not been 
fully litigated in any court). Although the issue of whether cy pres beneficiaries’ lack of standing 
creates impermissible separation of powers issues has not been fully litigated, the increasing amount 
of criticism of the current practice in the literature suggests that the issue may be addressed soon. See 
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One scholar has suggested that the lack of standing of potential cy pres 
beneficiaries, together with other problems associated with the practice, is suf-
ficient grounds to entirely abandon the practice of cy pres settlements in gen-
eral.82 The basis for this argument is that the practice of allowing judges to go 
beyond resolving live cases and controversies—by making choices as to the 
proper cy pres award recipient—contravenes the core constitutional dictate of 
limited judicial power and undermines the validity of the use of the class ac-
tion process.83 
 Despite the merits of this line of argument, it is not necessarily a reason 
to abandon the entrenched practice of cy pres distributions.84 In response, 
courts and commentators should look beyond the obvious fact that potential cy 
pres distribution recipients do not have Article III standing, and recognize that, 
in practice, such distribution decisions are often made in the context of a very 
real dispute over whether such a distribution is proper.85 Since litigants—
particularly plaintiffs seeking further pro rata distributions of excess settlement 
funds—genuinely dispute a proposed distribution, there is an adversarial na-
ture to these situations.86 As such, the court can make its decision whether to 
                                                                                                                           
generally Yospe, supra note 10, at 1021 (questioning the level of discretion afforded to federal judges 
in cy pres distributions). 
 82 See Redish et al., supra note 3, at 624 (arguing that the current cy pres framework should be 
abandoned because of constitutional issues).  
 83 See id.; see also Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. U.S. ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 771 (2000) 
(holding that standing requirements are an essential and unchanging part of the Article III case or 
controversy requirement, which serves to limit the power of the judicial branch). 
 84 See infra notes 85–102 and accompanying text (explaining ways courts may get around the 
Article III standing requirement). 
 85 See, e.g., In re Lupron, 677 F.3d at 32 (providing an example of a case in which consumer 
plaintiffs challenged the court’s decision to distribute some of residual funds to a cancer treatment 
center, arguing that the funds should have been made available for further pro rata distribution to class 
members); Klier, 658 F.3d at 471 (providing an example of a case in which plaintiffs challenged the 
court’s decision to ignore the terms of the settlement agreement and instead distributing excess funds 
as a cy pres award). 
 86 See, e.g., In re Lupron, 677 F.3d at 32 (providing an example where plaintiffs challenged the 
court’s decision to distribute some of residual funds to a cancer treatment center); Klier, 658 F.3d at 
471 (providing an example where plaintiffs challenged the court’s decision to ignore the terms of the 
settlement agreement, instead distributing excess funds as a cy pres award). It should be noted that, 
generally, the dispute arises in the context of some class members challenging that the settlement is 
fair, reasonable, and adequate on the grounds that they should receive further pro rata distributions 
rather than have the excess funds go to a charitable organization. See In re Lupron, 677 F.3d at 32. 
The ideal situation would be an adversarial proceeding in which the class members claim that a cy 
pres distribution violates their right to receive further pro rata distributions and the cy pres beneficiary 
along with the defendant defends the propriety of a cy pres distribution. See id. This is because in such 
a case there is no standing issue, since the plaintiffs are claiming an injury in fact and the cy pres ben-
eficiary steps into the role of the defendant to advocate for why a cy pres distribution does not cause 
an intrusion on the plaintiffs’ legally cognizable rights. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (noting that plain-
tiffs would have an injury in fact if they allege an invasion of some legally protected interest). In this 
case, the legally protected interest infringed upon the by cy pres distribution would be the class mem-
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distribute to this or that cy pres beneficiary—or to distribute excess funds pro 
rata to class members—based on the arguments advanced by the litigants and 
the cy pres beneficiary.87 In this way, one could argue that the purpose underly-
ing standing requirements is met.88 This is because there is often a real adver-
sarial proceeding underlying the distribution, which helps ensure that judges 
remain firmly engrained in their roles as arbiters of disputes rather than legisla-
tors or executives.89 
Although a semi-adversarial process to determine whether cy pres distri-
bution is proper is a solution that could potentially achieve the purposes under-
lying standing requirements, it will not have this result in all cases.90 For ex-
ample, this approach will fail in cases where the class members and the de-
fendant agree to cy pres in general, but no potential beneficiaries present them-
selves to compete for a distribution.91 In these cases, the judge would simply 
be forced to decide on an organization to which the funds should be distribut-
ed.92 In this way the judge would be put back into the potentially constitution-
                                                                                                                           
bers’ rights to fully recover for their actual damages. See id., 504 U.S. at 560 (noting that plaintiffs 
would have an injury in fact if they allege an invasion of some legally protected interest). 
 87 See In re Compact Disk, 370 F. Supp. 2d at 322. In 2005 in In re Compact Disk Minimum Ad-
vertised Price Antitrust Litigation, the U.S. District Court for the District of Maine created a semi-
adversarial process by requiring the parties and the potential cy pres beneficiaries to submit competing 
proposals for how the funds should be used by charitable organizations to provide the next best bene-
fit to the class members. See id. Some commentators have suggested that this type of semi-adversarial 
proceeding works to increase the chances of the court reaching an appropriate result, but as of now it 
is unclear whether any court has considered whether such a proceeding would resolve the standing 
issues discussed in this Note. See Yospe, supra note 10, at 1050–51. 
 88 See Allen, 486 U.S. at 752 (noting that the law of Article III standing is built on the idea of 
separation of powers). Cy pres distributions where a judge unilaterally selects a cy pres recipient like-
ly infringes on the separation of powers doctrine, because in that capacity a judge is not performing 
the traditional role of resolving disputes and is instead functioning like a legislator by appropriating 
funds under government control. Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative powers herein 
granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States . . . .”), and United States v. Butler, 297 
U.S. 1, 64 (1936) (noting that the legislative branch has the exclusive power to appropriate funds for 
the general welfare of the nation), with U.S. CONST. art. III (providing that the judicial branch of the 
government shall have jurisdiction over cases or controversies, but notably lacking any mention of a 
judicial appropriation of funds). 
 89 See Flast, 392 U.S. at 95 (noting that the Article III case or controversy requirement restricts 
the business of the judicial branch to questions presented in an adversarial context). 
 90 See Yospe, supra note 10, at 1052 (not addressing the constitutional question of standing for cy 
pres beneficiaries, but noting that a semi-adversarial process for cy pres distributions does not always 
achieve ideal results). 
 91 But see Diamond Chem. Co. v. Akzo Nobel Chems. B.V., 517 F. Supp. 2d 212, 217 (D.D.C. 
2007) (explaining the existence of an adversarial dispute despite no competing cy pres beneficiaries 
presenting themselves because class members and defendants heavily litigated the propriety of the cy 
pres distribution and the propriety of class members’ proposed recipient). 
 92 See In re Motorsports, 160 F. Supp. 2d at 1395–96 (in which an adversarial process was 
achieved because defendants opposed plaintiffs’ proposed cy pres distribution and the court solicited 
and considered proposals from potential cy pres award recipients). 
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ally impermissible role of appropriating funds outside of the context of resolv-
ing a live case or controversy.93 
Another possible solution to the standing issue would be to remove the 
potential cy pres beneficiaries from the litigation process.94 To do this, courts 
could simply mandate that a settlement will not be approved unless the parties 
agree as to how the potential excess funds will be distributed.95 In this agree-
ment, the parties could stipulate that all or part of the remaining funds will be 
distributed to a cy pres beneficiary.96 If the parties agree to distribute potential 
excess funds to cy pres beneficiaries, they must designate which entities will 
receive distributions and in what proportion the funds will be distributed.97 
One problem with requiring the parties to contractually agree upon a cy 
pres recipient is that it could impede the settlement process.98 Courts have rec-
ognized that in some cases defendants may want to choose a cy pres recipient 
that would provide it with some sort of indirect benefit—like a charitable or-
ganization in which employees of the defendant would play a major role.99 
Class members would be unlikely to agree to such an arrangement, and would 
likely demand distribution to the charitable organization that would most di-
                                                                                                                           
 93 See Allen, 486 U.S. 737, 752 (1984) (noting that the case or controversy requirement is de-
signed to ensure that the unelected judicial branch remains within the confines of its defined role—
adjudicating disputes—within our system of government). 
 94 See Yospe, supra note 10, at 1055–56 (noting that a potential solution to some problems arising 
from cy pres distributions would be to require the parties to contractually agree upon how excess 
funds will be distributed prior to the certification stage). 
 95 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2) (requiring the representative parties to fairly and adequately repre-
sent the interests of the absent class members as a condition of class certification). Courts could re-
quire such an agreement about how excess settlement funds will be distributed in the event of a set-
tlement on the basis that this is necessary to ensure that the unnamed class members will be adequate-
ly represented in the proceedings. See id. 
 96 Yospe, supra note 10, at 1055–56 (giving an example of a clause that could be introduced into 
an agreement between the class members and the defendant stipulating how unclaimed funds should 
be allocated). 
 97 See id. It would be essential that the parties stipulate particular charities and the proportion of 
any unclaimed funds that go to each charity, because if they do not, the judge will be put back into the 
role of determining how to allocate the funds. See infra notes 157–162 and accompanying text (ex-
plaining how judges can only accept or reject settlement agreements; they do not have the authority to 
force parties to agree to specific terms unilaterally). 
 98 See infra notes 99–102 and accompanying text (analyzing the potential impact of requiring cy 
pres beneficiary designations to be part of any class action settlement agreements). 
 99 See Marek, 134 S. Ct. at 9 (statement of Roberts, C.J.) (noting that, despite opposition from 
class members, plaintiffs’ counsel and the defendant agreed on a cy pres distribution to a newly creat-
ed foundation governed, in part, by the defendant’s employees). For example, in Lane v. Facebook, 
Inc., a group of class members objected to a settlement under which unnamed class members would 
receive no direct distributions and the vast majority of funds would go to class counsel and to a chari-
table organization in which the defendant would play a major—and public—role. See 696 F.3d 811, 
817–18 (9th Cir. 2012). In that case, the fact that the defendant would reap the benefit of goodwill 
based on its public participation in the cy pres recipient organization could have played a role in moti-
vating some class members to challenge the settlement. See id. 
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rectly advance the interests underlying their case.100 In this inevitable situation, 
requiring the parties to agree upon the cy pres beneficiary could impede the 
parties from actually reaching a settlement.101 In practice, however, this con-
cern probably would not extinguish this solution as a viable alternative because 
the choice of a cy pres recipient would be a small portion of a much larger set-
tlement agreement, and would almost certainly not be the most contentious 
point in the agreement.102 
B. No Checks on Power: Unfettered Judicial Discretion  
with Cy Pres Distributions 
This Section discusses the potential for appearances of impropriety asso-
ciated with granting unelected judges the discretion to distribute large sums of 
money in cy pres distributions.103 Cy pres remedies present a unique problem: 
they often require federal judges to determine which of several competing enti-
ties—none of whom are interested in the underlying litigation—will receive 
potentially large sums of money.104 Courts, commentators, and the media have 
noted this problem.105 The appearance of impropriety is particularly striking 
                                                                                                                           
 100 Cf. Lane, 696 F.3d at 820 (explaining how class members challenged the propriety of a cy pres 
distribution to an organization on the grounds that a person with ties to the defendant served on the 
board of the charitable organization). But see Diamond Chem., 517 F. Supp. 2d at 220 (detailing how 
a class of chemical purchasers allegedly injured by suppliers’ anticompetitive actions proposed and 
defended a cy pres distribution to an endowment at a law school to fund research into foreign and 
domestic consumer antitrust law, an allocation of funds that arguably provides little benefit to these 
specific plaintiffs). 
 101 See Bourlas v. Davis Law Assocs., 237 F.R.D. 345, 356 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (explaining how 
class members and the defendant reached a settlement specifically providing for a cy pres distribution 
of unclaimed funds while identifying specific cy pres beneficiaries in the settlement agreement); Hop-
son v. Hanesbrands, Inc., No. CV-08-0844 EDL, 2009 WL 928133, at * 9–10 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 
2009) (approving a settlement where the parties agreed that if unclaimed settlement funds were below 
a certain threshold, those funds would be distributed to specifically agreed upon charities, even though 
those charities lacked any substantial nexus to the interests of the class members). 
 102 In some cases, the potential amount of unclaimed funds is relatively small in comparison to 
the overall settlement, and the negotiation over the cy pres recipient may not have a negative impact 
on the parties’ ability to come to an agreement. See Hopson, 2009 WL 928133, at * 9–10. 
 103 See infra notes 104–173 and accompanying text. 
 104 See In re Compact Disk, 236 F.R.D. at 53 (expressing concern that federal judges are not 
equipped to operate as charities because they lack the resources to ensure that the funds are used as 
directed and they are not accountable to any board of directors, or even the general population, given 
their unelected status and lifetime tenure); see also In re Lupron, 677 F.3d at 38 (remarking that fed-
eral judges’ Article III functions ordinarily does not include disbursement of funds to charitable or-
ganizations). See generally Yospe, supra note 10, at 1021 (questioning whether there is something 
fundamentally wrong with vesting judges with relatively unchecked discretion to distribute excess 
settlement funds to charitable organizations and proposing potential alternative distributions schemes). 
 105 See, e.g., Klier, 658 F.3d at 480-81 (Jones, J., concurring); In re Airline Ticket Comm’n Anti-
trust Litig., 268 F.3d 619, 625 (8th Cir. 2001) (noting that application of the cy pres doctrine in class 
action litigation has been a subject of controversy in federal appellate courts); SEC v. Bear, Sterns & 
Co., 626 F. Supp. 2d 402, 416 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (noting that absent specific legislation courts have 
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when the cy pres recipient bears little or no relationship to the class members 
or the objectives underlying the lawsuit.106 Underlying these distributions is an 
interpretation and application of the cy pres doctrine that is accepted in some 
courts but disfavored by others.107 This interpretation is essentially that there 
are no limitations on a court’s discretion to distribute excess settlement funds 
to charitable organizations.108 
As an example, in the 2011 case In re Motorsports Merchandise Antitrust 
Litigation in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, con-
sumers brought a price-fixing suit against vendors of merchandise sold at pro-
fessional stock car races.109 There, nearly $2 million remained in the settlement 
pool after distributions were made to all plaintiffs who filed claims.110 The 
court solicited proposals from charitable organizations and ultimately decided 
to distribute $250,000 to nine different organizations, including the Lawyers 
Foundation of Georgia, a drug prevention program, a breast cancer foundation, 
                                                                                                                           
generally unfettered discretion to distribute large sums of excess settlement funds to charitable organi-
zations); Adam Liptack, Doling Out Other People’s Money, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 26, 2007), http://
www.nytimes.com/2007/11/26/washington/26bar.html?_r=0, archived at http://perma.cc/CV4Z-
LL6M (noting that cy pres distributions are an invitation to “wild corruption of the judicial process”); 
Editorial, When Judges Get Generous, WASH. POST (Dec. 17, 2007), http://www.washingtonpost.
com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/12/16/AR2007121601433.html, archived at http://perma.cc/A8AR-
BR3G (asserting that it borders on distasteful when judges allocate excess settlement funds to charita-
ble organizations that bear little or no relationship to the plaintiffs or the underlying litigation); see 
also Johnston, supra note 32, at 278 (noting that concerns about the potential for abuses of discretion 
date back to as early as 1801 when one English jurist, Lord Kenyon, remarked that “the doctrine of cy 
pres goes to the utmost verge of the law . . . and we must take care that it does not run wild”). 
 106 See When Judges Get Generous, supra note 105 (criticizing a district court’s decision to dis-
tribute excess settlement funds to groups combating substance abuse and eating disorders in a case 
involving allegations of antitrust violations by modeling agencies). 
107 Compare In re Lupron, 677 F.3d at 33 (emphasizing that failing to distribute cy pres funds to 
organizations that reasonably approximate the interests of the class or the objectives underlying their 
claims can lead to reversal), with Superior Beverage Co., v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 827 F. Supp. 477, 
479 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (holding that the cy pres doctrine permits courts to distribute funds for public 
interest purposes other than those approximating the interests of the class members and the purposes 
underlying their claims). 
 108 See Superior Beverage Co., 827 F. Supp. at 479 (holding that the cy pres doctrine permits 
courts to distribute funds for public interest purposes other than those approximating the interests of 
the class members and the purposes underlying their claims). Some courts will entirely eschew any 
requirement of a nexus. See Jones v. Nat’l Distillers, 56 F. Supp. 2d 355, 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (ap-
proving of the proposition that, in the absence of an obvious cy pres recipient, courts may distribute 
excess settlement funds to a use completely unrelated to the interest of the class members). Without 
the requirement that there be some nexus between the class members’ interests and the interests ad-
vanced by the cy pres recipient, it is harder to ensure that the funds will provide the intended indirect 
benefit to the class members. See, e.g., Lane, 696 F.3d at 821 (holding that a cy pres recipient must 
bear a “substantial nexus” to the interests of the class members so as to increase likelihood of provid-
ing the “next best benefit”). 
 109 See In re Motorsports, 160 F. Supp. 2d at 1393. 
 110 See id. at 1395. 
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and a children’s hospital.111 Although these organizations are undoubtedly ded-
icated to advancing the public interest in important ways, it is unclear how 
they provide any more benefit to class members—NASCAR fans in Georgia—
than they would to the general public, or how they advance the purposes un-
derlying plaintiff’s lawsuit.112 
Despite a court’s best intentions, unrestricted discretion to distribute large 
amounts of funds remaining in a settlement pool will at best provoke litigants 
to question the fairness of the distribution and at worst provoke suspicions of 
impropriety.113 In addition to the potential for appearances of impropriety, this 
unfettered discretion can be a burden on court resources.114  
Further, burdening judges with unfettered discretion to distribute large cy 
pres funds can make the judges themselves uncomfortable not only with the 
possibility of improper appearances, but also with performing a task with 
which they are neither accustomed nor experienced.115 One former federal 
judge describe the task of distributing cy pres funds as “not a true judicial 
function” that can “lead to abuses,” and noted that it made him “more than a 
little uncomfortable that groups would solicit [him] for consideration as recipi-
ents of cy pres awards.”116 
The remainder of this Section outlines three ways to mitigate these prob-
lems.117 First, Subsection 1 discusses the “substantial nexus” requirement be-
tween the interests of the class and the interests advanced by the cy pre recipi-
ent.118 Subsection 2 then explains how parties could be required to select cy 
pres recipients.119 Finally, Subsection 3 examines how legislative action could 
designate mandatory default cy pres beneficiaries.120 
                                                                                                                           
 111 See id. 
 112 See Dennis v. Kellogg Co., 697 F.3d 858, 865 (9th Cir. 2012) (requiring a substantial nexus 
between the interests advanced by the cy pres recipient and the interests of the class members to en-
sure that the award will result in the “next best” benefit to class members). In this case, the nexus 
between the objectives underlying the plaintiffs’ suit and the interests advanced by the cy pres award 
recipients is clearly lacking. See In re Motorsports, 160 F. Supp. 2d at 1397–98. This is especially true 
given that one of the recipients—a Duke University children’s hospital—is located in North Carolina, 
since most of the class members are located in Georgia. See id. at 1398; see also Superior Beverage 
Co., 827 F. Supp. at 485 (granting a cy pres distribution from funds derived from antitrust suit brought 
by industrial glass consumers to an art museum to commission works by a preeminent glass artist). 
 113 See Liptack, supra note 105 (noting that cy pres distributions are an invitation to “wild corrup-
tion of the judicial process”); When Judges Get Generous, supra note 105 (asserting that it borders on 
distasteful when judges allocate excess settlement funds to charitable organizations that bear little or 
no relationship to the plaintiffs or the underlying litigation). 
 114 See In re Compact Disk, 236 F.R.D. at 53 (noting that federal judges do not have the institu-
tional resources and competencies to act as charitable foundations). 
 115 See Liptack, supra note 105. 
 116 See id. 
 117 See infra notes 121–173 and accompanying text. 
118 See infra notes 121–156 and accompanying text. 
119 See infra notes 157–162 and accompanying text. 
120 See infra notes 163–173 and accompanying text. 
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1. The “Substantial Nexus” Requirement 
Courts, legislatures, and commentators have proposed different solutions 
to the problems arising out of vesting the judiciary with unfettered discretion 
to distribute excess settlement funds.121 The primary solution—advanced by 
many circuit courts and the American Law Institute (“ALI”)—is to require that 
cy pres recipients advance interests that “reasonably approximate” the interests 
of the class.122 Generally speaking, this principle requires some level of con-
gruence between the objectives of the cy pres recipient and the interests the 
class sought to advance through their suit.123 
In some cases, the key factor limiting the potential for appearances of im-
propriety inherent in unfettered judicial discretion to make cy pres distribu-
tions is the fact that the court was restricted to considering those organizations 
that reasonably approximate the interests of the class.124 The following exam-
ples are offered to illustrate the type of close nexus courts should strive to find 
between the interests of the class members and the interests advanced by the cy 
pres recipient so as to reduce the appearance of judges inappropriately dolling 
out settlement funds.125 
In 2001, in In re Lupron Marketing and Sales Practices Litigation, the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed a case where the plain-
tiffs—a class of individuals who alleged to having been overcharged for a drug 
used to treat prostate cancer, endometriosis, and premature puberty in chil-
dren—agreed to a settlement whereby unclaimed funds would be distributed at 
the discretion of the district judge.126 Given the high mortality rate of class 
members, the multiple rounds of notices expected to inform class members of 
their right to compensation resulted in only a fraction of class members actual-
                                                                                                                           
 121 See, e.g., In re Lupron, 677 F.3d at 33 (requiring that charitable organizations must advance 
interests that reasonably approximate the interest of the uncompensated class members to qualify as a 
cy pres distribution recipient); Jois, supra note 52, at 258 (arguing that judicial discretion to distribute 
unclaimed settlement funds should be abandoned in favor of general escheat to the state). 
 122 See In re Lupron, 677 F.3d at 33. Some circuit courts have adopted the “reasonable approxi-
mation” language first proposed in the ALI’s Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation. See 
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 3.07 cmt. b (2010). Other courts have adopted 
a “substantial nexus” requirement. See Lane, 696 F.3d at 821 (holding that a district court should not 
approve a cy pres distribution unless it bears a “substantial nexus” to the interests of the class mem-
bers). 
 123 See In re Lupron, 677 F.3d at 33 (holding that cy pres distributions must reasonably approxi-
mate the interests of the class members, and instructing trial courts to consider the following factors in 
making this decision: (1) the purposes of any statute the class seeks remedy under, (2) the nature of 
the injury to the class members, (3) the geographic scope of the class members, (4) the reasons why 
settlement funds have gone unclaimed, and (5) the “closeness in fit” between the class and the cy pres 
recipient). 
 124 See In re Lupron, 677 F.3d at 33. 
 125 See infra notes 126–144 and accompanying text. 
 126 See In re Lupron, 677 F.3d at 22. 
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ly filing for distributions.127 Ultimately, after $11.4 million remained in the 
settlement fund once the consumer class members had filed for distributions, it 
was determined that additional notice campaigns would be unlikely to yield 
additional claimants.128 According to the terms set out in the settlement agree-
ment, which gave the district court the discretion to distribute excess settle-
ment funds, the district court determined that it would distribute the balance of 
the remaining settlement funds to an organization dedicated to researching 
medical conditions treated by the drug Lupron.129 
On appeal, some class members challenged the settlement as an abuse of 
the court’s discretion, but the First Circuit affirmed the district court’s approval 
of the settlement and found that there was no abuse of discretion.130 In affirm-
ing, the First Circuit emphasized that the distribution to the research institu-
tions was proper because class members would receive tangible benefits from 
research into the types of conditions that required them to purchase the drugs 
for which they were overcharged.131  
Similarly, in 1997, in Powell v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed a case in which plaintiffs were a class 
of workers who alleged that their employer had violated their rights under Title 
VII.132 According to the terms of the settlement agreement, any funds remain-
ing in the settlement pool after distribution would be distributed at the district 
court’s discretion.133 After distributions to individual class members and a de-
termination that additional class members were unlikely to materialize, nearly 
$1 million remained in the settlement fund, most of which was the result of 
interest accrued on the funds.134 
Nearly eight years after the initial disbursement of funds to class mem-
bers, the plaintiffs eventually filed a motion for the court to distribute the re-
maining $1 million in settlement funds at its discretion.135 In this motion, the 
plaintiffs requested that the court use the funds to establish academic scholar-
ships for themselves and their relatives.136 In addition, the defendant corpora-
tion filed a status report at the request of the court seeking to have the funds 
                                                                                                                           
 127 See id. at 26–27. 
 128 See id. 
 129 See id. 
 130 See id. at 37. 
 131 See id. at 34–35. It is this type of indirect benefit to the class members that distinguishes dis-
tributions meeting the substantial nexus requirement from distributions that do not meet this standard. 
See Superior Beverage Co., 827 F. Supp. at 485 (granting a cy pres distribution from funds derived 
from an antitrust suit brought by industrial glass consumers to an art museum to commission works by 
a preeminent glass artist). 
 132 See 119 F.3d 703, 704 (8th Cir. 1997). 
 133 Id. 
 134 See id. at 705. 
 135 Id. 
 136 Id. 
2015] Cy Pres Beneficiaries in Class Action Settlement Agreements 753 
distributed to its chartable subsidiaries for the purposes of establishing a schol-
arship fund for black high school students.137 Despite the initial basic agree-
ment between the plaintiffs and the defendants as to how the remaining funds 
should be utilized, the plaintiffs ultimately decided to change their minds and 
seek further pro rata distribution directly to class members.138 The district court 
ultimately rejected the plaintiffs’ amended motion for direct pro rata distribu-
tion and ordered the parties to submit an agreed upon scholarship program.139 
Upon the advice of the parties, the district court distributed the funds to a 
scholarship program intended to be available only to black students in the vi-
cinity of Crossett, Arkansas—the town in which the class members resided.140 
Plaintiffs appealed the district court’s approval of this cy pres distribution, 
seeking to secure further pro rata distributions directly to class members.141 On 
appeal, the Eighth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discre-
tion in approving distribution of the remaining settlement funds to the scholar-
ship programs.142 In so holding, the Eighth Circuit emphasized that the distri-
bution for scholarships not only provided a relatively close indirect benefit to 
class members by subsidizing education for their children and relatives, but 
also sought to address the concerns underlying plaintiffs’ claims—the em-
ployment opportunities available to African Americans living near the defend-
ant’s facilities in Crossett, Arkansas.143 As in In re Lupron, the nexus between 
the interests of the class members—equalizing employment opportunities for 
African American citizens living near defendant’s facilities—and the interests 
advanced cy pres recipient—furthering higher educational opportunities for 
African American students living near defendant’s facilities so as to improve 
employment prospects—was sufficient to find no abuse of discretion.144 
This congruence or “substantial nexus” is required by many courts—and 
suggested by the ALI—because it not only increases the chances that a cy pres 
distribution will actually provide the “next best” benefit to class members, but 
because it also decreases the likelihood that either the litigants or the general 
public will perceive any impropriety by the presiding district court judge in 
making the cy pres distribution.145 In this way, adoption and strict application 
                                                                                                                           
 137 See id. 
 138 See id. 
 139 See id. 
 140 See id. at 707. 
 141 See id. 
 142 See id. 
 143 See id.; see also In re Airline Ticket Comm’n, 307 F.3d at 683 (discussing and approving of 
the Powell court’s decision to affirm the district court’s cy pres distribution for the purposes of estab-
lishing the scholarship funds). 
 144 See In re Lupron, 677 F.3d at 36–37; Powell, 119 F.3d at 707. 
 145 See In re Lupron, 677 F.3d at 33; PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 3.07 
(2010). 
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of the “substantial nexus” or “reasonable approximation” requirement is a 
strong mechanism for shielding courts and judges from the potential for ap-
pearances of impropriety inherent in the unrestricted discretion to make cy pres 
distributions.146 
Despite the benefits of applying and strictly construing a substantial nex-
us requirement, this requirement is an imperfect solution to the potential for 
appearances of impropriety inherent in vesting judges with the discretion to 
make cy pres distributions.147 Specifically, this solution fails to address the 
problem because of two related factors.148 First, application of the substantial 
nexus requirement does not fully remove judicial discretion in making cy pres 
distributions, and as such the potential for appearances of impropriety will al-
ways remain.149 This is because courts can strain the boundaries of the substan-
tial nexus requirement.150 Courts do this to varying degrees of success, but 
generally arrive at distributions that may appear to bear a nexus to the interest 
of the class, but in reality provide no more indirect benefit to the class mem-
bers than it would to the general public.151 
Second, there are often situations in which the court could try its best to 
apply the substantial nexus standard, but fail to arrive at a distribution with a 
                                                                                                                           
 146 See Draba, supra note 10, at 135–40 (discussing the advantages of requiring a nexus between 
the interests of the plaintiffs and the interests advanced by the cy pres recipient and commenting on 
the problems that can arise when there is a cy pres distribution that lacks a nexus to the interests of the 
class). 
 147 See id. See also generally Yospe, supra note 10 (discussing cases in which the court applied 
the substantial nexus requirement on its face, but reached a distribution that in reality bore a highly 
attenuated link to the interests of the class). 
 148 See infra notes 149–154 and accompanying text. 
 149 See generally Yospe, supra note 10 (discussing cases in which the court applied the substan-
tial nexus requirement on its face, but reached a distribution that in reality bore a highly attenuated 
link to the interests of the class). 
 150 See, e.g., In re Infant Formula Multidistrict Litig., No. 4:91-CV-00878-MP, 2005 WL 
2211312, at *3 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 8, 2005) (applying the nexus requirement to arrive at a distribution of 
$1 million in excess settlement funds to Hurricane Katrina relief when a settlement arose out of a 
nationwide infant formula price-fixing case because one major issue faced by relief agencies was 
providing essential food and drink to victims). 
 151 See Diamond Chem. Co. v. Akzo Nobel Chems. B.V., Nos. 01-2118(CKK), 02-1018(CKK), 
2007 WL 2007447, at *5 (D.D.C. July 10, 2007) (approving a cy pres distribution to George Wash-
ington Law School to fund national and international antitrust research in a case involving alleged 
price-fixing of industrial chemicals). Cases like the 2007 decision Diamond Chemical Co. v. Akzo 
Nobel Chemicals B.V. from the federal District Court in D.C. serve as a perfect example of poor ap-
plication of the substantial nexus requirement, because at first there appears to be a nexus—the class 
brought an antitrust action and the recipient planned to do antitrust research—but without guidance on 
what type of antitrust research the school would perform, there is no guarantee that the research would 
benefit the chemical purchaser class member any more than it would benefit other consumers general-
ly. See id. It is difficult to see how the distribution in Diamond Chemical Co. provided the “next best” 
benefit to the class members. See id.; see also Naschin v. AOL LLC, 663 F.3d 1034,1036 (9th Cir. 
2011) (noting that the cy pres doctrine is to be applied to distribute funds to the “next best” class of 
beneficiaries). 
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sufficiently close nexus to avoid any potential for appearances of improprie-
ty.152 This is due to the fact that, given the diverse range of interests advanced 
by class action litigants, there is a significant chance that there will not be an 
existing charity advancing similar interests.153 When judges are stuck with a 
class that has interests not reasonably approximated by any existing charity, 
they are forced to strain the substantial nexus requirement or eschew it all to-
gether.154 
It is not suggested that courts strain the application of the substantial nex-
us requirement to advance their own interests; rather, judges are forced to 
strain it because it is often the case that there are no charitable organizations 
reasonably approximating the interests of the class.155 As such, the substantial 
nexus requirement is an imperfect solution because anytime there is a tenuous 
connection between the class and the beneficiary the specter of impropriety 
will be present.156 
2. Requiring Parties to Select a Cy Pres Recipient as a Condition of 
Settlement 
In addition to the “substantial nexus” or “reasonable approximation” re-
quirements, some courts and commentators have suggested another solution to 
                                                                                                                           
 152 See In re Motorsports, 160 F. Supp. 2d at 1395. 
 153 See id. In re Motorsports is a perfect example of this phenomenon—the class members were 
NASCAR fans who alleged that they were overcharged for their Dale Earnhardt Jr. trucker caps be-
cause of price-fixing among the vendors. See id. The issue is that there are no charities advancing the 
interests of NASCAR fans who were the victims of price-fixing, so the court simply chose random 
charities. See id. The court could have gone the route of the Diamond Chemical Co. court and allocat-
ed the funds to an antitrust research and enforcement foundation. See Diamond Chem., 2007 WL 
2007447, at *5. But this would still run into the problem that not all victims of alleged antitrust viola-
tions have the same interests—allocation of funds to an antitrust research organization will not, with-
out specific directives on what industry the research should focus on, benefit NASCAR fans any more 
than it would benefit victims of alleged antitrust violations in the industrial chemical industry. See 
Diamond Chem., 2007 WL 2007447, at *5; In re Motorsports, 160 F. Supp. 2d at 1395. In this way, 
support of antitrust research generally is unlikely to provide the “next best” benefit to victims of al-
leged antitrust violations in a specific industry. See Diamond Chem., 2007 WL 2007447, at *5; supra 
note 154 and accompanying text (explaining how a court cannot monitor cy pres distributions effec-
tively after they are made). 
 154 Compare Superior Beverage Co., 827 F. Supp. at 479 (eschewing the substantial nexus re-
quirement and distributing funds to organizations that promote the public interest generally rather than 
any interest advanced by the class), with In re Infant Formula, 2005 WL 2211312, at *3 (applying the 
substantial nexus requirement, but straining to justify a tenuous nexus between a nationwide class 
alleging that they were overcharged for baby formula and Hurricane Katrina relief organizations). 
 155 Cf. In re Motorsports, 160 F. Supp. 2d at 1395 (exemplifying that no charitable organization 
existed which reasonably approximated interests of class). 
 156 See Naschin, 663 F.3d at 1039 (noting that the specter of judges and outside entities dealing in 
the distribution of settlement money can create the potential for appearances of impropriety); When 
Judges Get Generous, supra note 105 (asserting that it borders on distasteful when judges allocate 
excess settlement funds to charitable organizations that bear little or no relationship to the plaintiffs or 
the underlying litigation). 
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the problem of potential appearances of impropriety on behalf of courts mak-
ing cy pres distributions would be to require the parties to reach an agreement 
about a particular cy pres recipient amongst themselves.157 One method hinted 
at by some courts and commentators would be to require the parties to reach an 
agreement about a particular cy pres recipient rather than put this decision 
solely on the court.158 Under this solution, the court would not approve of a 
settlement unless the parties had agreed to how any unclaimed funds would be 
appropriated.159 
Imposing such a requirement on parties during the settlement process, 
along with strictly applying the “substantial nexus” or “reasonable approxima-
tion” requirement, would achieve two important results.160 First, it would ex-
tinguish the possibility that class members would see the distribution as unfair 
or that the judge had somehow acted improperly in selecting the cy pres recipi-
ent.161 Second, it would alleviate the significant burdens associated with de-
termining which competing cy pres applicants should receive a cy pres award 
by shifting these costs to the litigants.162 
                                                                                                                           
157 See infra notes 158–162 and accompanying text (discussing requiring that parties select 
a cy pres beneficiary as a potential solution to the problem for appearances of impropriety). 
 158 See In re Lupron, 677 F.3d at 38 (expressing concern about the parties abandoning the process 
of settling how to allocate unclaimed funds to the court, and emphasizing that courts could avoid these 
concerns by requiring the parties to identify cy pres recipients); PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGRE-
GATE LITIGATION § 3.07(c) (2010) (providing that, whenever feasible, the court should require the 
parties to select a cy pre beneficiary that reasonably approximates the interests of the class). Courts 
and commentators have suggested that once a settlement has been reached and there are excess funds 
remaining, the court should require the parties to select a cy pres beneficiary. See In re Lupron, 677 
F.3d at 38. This Note argues that the court should require the parties to allocate potential unclaimed 
settlement funds before the approval of any settlement—i.e., courts should not approve settlements 
unless there is an agreed upon disposition of unclaimed funds. See infra notes 190–211 and accompa-
nying text (arguing that judges should reject settlement agreements that do not contemplate what hap-
pens to excess funds); see also Yospe, supra note 10, at 1055–56 (suggesting that problems associated 
with the current unfettered discretion afforded to judges regarding the disposition of unclaimed set-
tlement funds could be alleviated if the parties agree on how to distribute these funds prior to distribu-
tion of the settlement). 
 159 See Bourlas, 237 F.R.D. at 356 (providing an example of a court approved settlement where 
the parties had already agreed on how excess settlement funds would be distributed). 
 160 See infra notes 161–162 and accompanying text. 
 161 When Judges Get Generous, supra note 105 (suggesting that it is inappropriate for judges to 
unilaterally select cy pres recipients and make distributions to those organizations). If the parties were 
to select the cy pres recipients themselves—or agree that the unclaimed funds should be allocated in 
some other manner, like reversion—there would be little concern that the judge was abusing his or her 
discretion. See Naschin, 663 F.3d at 1039 (noting that the specter of judges and outside entitles deal-
ing in distribution of settlement money can create the potential for appearances of impropriety). 
 162 See In re Lupron, 677 F.3d at 37–38 (noting that having judges research and select cy pres 
recipients taxes judicial resources). 
2015] Cy Pres Beneficiaries in Class Action Settlement Agreements 757 
3. Statutorily Mandating Cy Pres Recipients 
Another way to shield judges from the potential for appearances of im-
propriety inherent in an unstructured cy pres distribution framework could 
originate in the legislative branch.163 Rather than require judges to solicit, 
evaluate, and ultimately select charitable organizations for cy pres awards in 
the absence of any agreement by the litigants, the legislature could determine 
how excess funds should be distributed.164 
Some state legislatures have already mandated that a certain portion of 
uncollected class action settlement funds be distributed to certain charitable 
organizations.165 For example, Washington’s court rules define the types of 
funds that may be subject to cy pres distribution—“residual funds.”166 The 
rules also require not only that any order approving a settlement agreement 
must provide for the distribution of residual funds, but also that no less than 
twenty five percent of such funds be distributed directly to the Legal Founda-
tion of Washington.167 Once at least twenty five percent of the residual funds 
have been distributed to the Legal Foundation of Washington, the courts have 
discretion to direct the remaining residual funds to any organization that bears 
a direct or indirect relationship to the objectives underlying the litigation, or to 
any organization that would otherwise promote the substantive or procedural 
interests of the class members.168 
                                                                                                                           
 163 See Bear, Sterns & Co., 626 F. Supp. 2d at 416 (outlining two state statutes that govern the 
distribution of unclaimed class action settlement funds); see also Yospe, supra note 10, at 1058–63 
(discussing the development of state statutes mandating cy pres distribution of unclaimed class action 
settlement funds to specified organizations). 
 164 See WASH. CT. R. 23(f)(2) (mandating that at least one quarter of residual settlement funds be 
distributed to the Legal Foundation of Washington to support access to the justice system for low 
income residents); MASS. R. CIV. P. 23(e) (providing that residual funds shall be distributed to a chari-
table organization which “support[s] projects that will benefit the class or similarly situated persons 
consistent with the objectives and purposes of the underlying causes of action on which relief was 
based” or to Massachusetts IOLTA Committee, an organization dedicated to improving access to the 
justice system for low income citizens); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-267.10 (2013) (providing that 
any unclaimed funds in class action litigation will be divided equally among the Indigent Persons 
Attorney Fund and the North Caroline State Bar to provide legal services for indigent persons). 
 165 See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-267.10; WASH. CT. R. 23(f)(2). 
 166 See WASH. CT. R. 23(f)(1) (defining “residual funds” as funds that remain after the payment of 
all approved class member claims, expenses, litigation costs, attorney’s fees, and other court approved 
disbursements to implement the relief granted). 
 167 See id. (f)(2). The Legal Foundation of Washington is an organization dedicated to promoting 
access to justice for low-income residents of Washington. See LEGAL FOUND. OF WASH., http://www.
legalfoundation.org, archived at http://perma.cc/F9AL-27PU (last visited Mar. 21, 2015). 
 168 See WASH. CT. R. 23(f)(2); see also Yospe, supra note 10, at 1061 (arguing that the Massa-
chusetts statute providing for the distribution of unclaimed settlement funds is the most sound of all 
the state statutes because it mandates for some connection between the interests of the class and the 
interests advanced by the cy pres recipient, whereas other state statutes simply mandate a percentage 
of the unclaimed funds go to a particular charity regardless of whether there is a connection to the 
interests of the class members). 
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State statutes providing for the distribution of excess settlement funds are 
an effective means of curtailing the problems arising out of unfettered judicial 
discretion—and could serve as a model should Congress act on this problem—
however, they give rise to several problems.169 First, these statutes often direct 
residual funds towards entities that bear little or no relationship to the interests 
of class members.170 This is problematic because courts have generally accept-
ed that excess settlement funds should be used to provide the “next best” bene-
fit to class members.171 Second, such statutes often do not totally remove the 
potential for appearances of impropriety since they do not remove all discre-
tion from the court in making cy pres awards.172 These problems result in inad-
equate distribution mechanisms, because the statute will either fail to remove 
judicial discretion or fail to allow for the cy pres distribution to be customized 
to the particular interests of the class.173 
III. AN ANTI-JUDICIARY JUDICIAL REMEDY: REQUIRING CY PRES 
BENEFICIARY DESIGNATIONS IN ALL CY  
PRES SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS  
Although cy pres settlements have a lot of potential, both constitutional 
and practical issues create serious problems with the system as it stands.174 The 
best way to avoid these problems is to require parties in class action settle-
ments to determine where excess funds will go before the court approves the 
settlement agreement.175 Section A explains the root of the two major problems 
                                                                                                                           
169 See infra notes 170–173 and accompanying text (discussing some of the problems of a 
legislative solution to cy pres distributions); see cf. Yospe, supra note 10, at 1061 (advocating for 
more legislation regarding cy pres distributions like that found in Massachusetts). 
 170 See WASH. CT. R. 23(f)(2) (requiring not less than one quarter of residual funds be distributed 
to the Legal Foundation of Washington to support access to the justice system for low income resi-
dents). But see MASS. R. CIV. P. 23(e) (codifying the “substantial nexus” requirement for cy pres dis-
tributions). 
 171 See Dennis, 697 F.3d at 865 (holding that cy pres award must qualify as the “next best” bene-
fit to giving funds directly to class members); In re Airline Ticket Comm’n, 307 F.3d at 683 (requiring 
that the cy pres award go to an organization that would provide the “next best” benefit to class mem-
bers). 
 172 See WASH. CT. R. 23(f)(2) (affording judges the discretion to distribute three quarters of the 
unclaimed funds). 
 173 Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-267.10 (2013) (providing that the settlement court shall direct 
the defendant to pay any unclaimed settlement funds to two particular charities, thereby removing 
judicial discretion as to the disposition of the funds but failing to allow for distribution to be tailored 
so that it goes to an organization that supports the causes underlying class members claims), with 
MASS. R. CIV. P. 23(e) (providing that the distribution of unclaimed settlement funds can be tailored 
to best advance the interests of the class, but failing to place concrete limits on judicial discretion). 
174 See Redish et al., supra note 3, at 641 (noting that separation of powers concerns arise because 
cy pres beneficiaries lack standing, thus forcing judges beyond the role of deciding a live case or con-
troversy); Liptack, supra note 105 (noting the potential for appearances of impropriety that arise out 
of judges distributing unclaimed settlement funds). 
175 See infra notes 190–211 and accompanying text. 
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with the current cy pres distribution framework.176 Then, Section B argues that 
these problems can be alleviated by requiring judges to reject any settlement 
agreement that does not contains a plan for how to allocate excess funds.177 
A. Unconstitutional with a Tinge of Impropriety:  
The Root of the Problem 
Two irreconcilable problems relating to the role of the court arise under 
the current cy pres analytical framework.178 First, separation of powers prob-
lems arise when, under the current cy pres framework, judges are forced to 
unilaterally make cy pres distributions to charitable organizations that lack Ar-
ticle III standing because they have suffered no injury in fact.179 The judge’s 
role as distributor of funds creates separation of powers issues because allocat-
ing residual funds is arguably beyond the judicial branch’s constitutionally des-
ignated role as arbiter of live “cases or controversies.”180 This is because there 
is no case or controversy when a judge makes a cy pres distribution, and the 
distribution is closer to an appropriation of funds—a role preserved for the leg-
islature.181  
The second problem relating to the role of judges under the current cy 
pres framework arises out of the relatively unfettered discretion afforded to 
judges in performing a distributive—rather than adjudicative—function.182 
When judges can select cy pres beneficiaries, particularly charities that bear 
little or no relation to the issues underlying the litigation, there is the potential 
                                                                                                                           
176 See infra notes 178–189 and accompanying text. 
177 See infra notes 190–211 and accompanying text. 
178 See infra notes 179–189 and accompanying text (arguing that there is no way around 
the clash between cy pres distributions and Article III standing requirements). 
 179 See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (noting that the doctrine of standing, which requires a plaintiff to 
show that they have suffered an “injury in fact,” is one of those landmarks that serves to identify dis-
putes that are properly resolved through the judicial process). Cy pres beneficiaries lack standing 
because they complain of no injury in fact. See id. (noting that an injury in fact is an invasion of some 
legally protected interest). 
 180 See Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 771 (2000) 
(noting that a litigant’s standing is an essential component of the case and controversy requirement, 
which serves to limit the power of the judicial branch). 
 181 See Redish et al., supra note 3, at 624 (arguing that the current cy pres framework should be 
abandoned because of constitutional issues); see also Vt. Agency of Natural Res., 529 U.S. at 771 
(holding that the three requirements for standing form an irreducible constitutional minimum standard, 
which is a key mechanism for limiting the power and activities of the judicial branch so as to ensure 
appropriate separation of powers). 
 182 See In re Compact Disk Minimum Advertised Price Antitrust Litig., 236 F.R.D. 48, 53 (D. 
Me. 2006) (expressing concern that federal judges are not equipped to operate as charities because 
they lack the resources to ensure that the funds are used as directed, and they are not accountable to 
any board of directors, or even the general population, given their unelected status and lifetime ten-
ure); see also In re Lupron Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 677 F.3d 21, 38 (1st Cir. 2012) (remarking 
that federal judges’ Article III functions ordinarily does not include disbursement of funds to charita-
ble organizations). 
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for appearances of impropriety.183 This problem is partially solved by requiring 
a “substantial nexus” between the interests of the class members and the inter-
ests advanced by the cy pres recipient.184 But this requirement does not extin-
guish the potential for appearances of impropriety because judges still retain a 
fair amount of discretion, and there will inevitably be cases in which no exist-
ing charity bears a sufficient nexus to the interests of the class to qualify as the 
distribution with the “next best” benefit.185 Furthermore, this nexus require-
ment does not entirely remove the cy pres beneficiaries from the process, and, 
as such, fails to solve the separation of powers issues associated with forcing 
judges outside of their constitutionally designated roles.186 
The separation of powers problem and the potential for appearances of 
impropriety both arise because the current cy pres framework forces courts out 
of the role for which they were designed and which the public understands and 
expects.187 Courts are constitutionally limited to resolution of disputes, and are 
expected by the public to remain securely planted in this role.188 As such, it is 
not surprising that both courts and the public are concerned about the role cur-
rently played by judges in the current cy pres framework.189 
                                                                                                                           
 183 See When Judges Get Generous, supra note 105 (asserting that it borders on distasteful when 
judges allocate excess settlement funds to charitable organizations that bear little or no relationship to 
the plaintiffs or the underlying litigation). 
 184 See In re Lupron, 677 F.3d at 33 (holding that failing to distribute cy pres funds to organiza-
tions that reasonably approximate the interests of the class or the objectives underlying their claims 
can lead to reversal on appeal). 
 185 See Draba, supra note 10, at 135–40 (discussing the advantages of requiring a nexus between 
the interests of the plaintiffs and the interests advanced by the cy pres recipient and commenting on 
the problems that can arise when there is a cy pres distribution that lacks a nexus to the interests of the 
class). 
 186 See Yospe, supra note 10, at 1025 (discussing cases in which the court applied the substantial 
nexus requirement on its face, but reached a distribution that in reality bore a highly attenuated link to 
the interests of the class). 
 187 See U.S. CONST. art. III (providing that the jurisdiction of the courts extends to resolution of 
“cases” and “controversies”); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968) (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 
186, 204 (1962)) (noting that issues historically viewed as being capable of judicial resolution are 
those that are presented in adversarial context); When Judges Get Generous, supra note 105 (express-
ing unease at the prospect of judges moving beyond the role of arbiters of disputes and into the role of 
making large charitable distributions to cy pres beneficiaries). 
 188 See U.S. CONST. art. III; Flast, 392 U.S. at 99; When Judges Get Generous, supra note 105 
(expressing concern about the current role of judges in making cy pres distributions). 
 189 See, e.g., Marek v. Lane, 134 S. Ct. 8, 9 (2013) (statement of Roberts, C. J.) (expressing con-
cern about the role of the judicial branch under the current cy pres distribution framework); In re Lu-
pron, 677 F.3d at 38 (providing a cautionary note to district courts engaged in cy pres distributions); 
Klier v. Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc., 658 F.3d 468, 480–82 (5th Cir. 2011) (Jones, J., concurring) (ex-
pressing concern that the current role of judges and cy pres beneficiaries raises constitutional standing 
issues). 
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B. Avoiding the Problem Entirely: Removing Judges  
from the Cy Pres Equation 
Because these problems arise out of the role judges currently play in the 
cy pres framework, the best solution is to remove the judges from playing any 
role in making cy pres distributions.190 Although some commentators have 
suggested that simply limiting the discretion judges have in awarding cy pres 
distributions will solve the problem, this is an imperfect solution because the 
court still performs a function beyond its constitutionally limited role of adju-
dicating disputes.191 Instead, judges and cy pres beneficiaries should not play 
any role in the distribution of excess settlement funds.192 To do this, courts 
should simply require litigants to contractually agree as to how any excess set-
tlement funds would be distributed.193  
This solution solves the constitutional issues discussed and extinguishes 
the potential for appearances of impropriety inherent in the current cy pres 
framework.194 Shifting the burden of allocating excess settlement funds to the 
litigants will have the effect of eliminating the separation of powers concerns 
discussed above, because judges would not be forced out of their constitution-
ally designated roles of resolving cases or controversies.195 Further, requiring 
the parties to agree to a distribution scheme for unclaimed settlement funds 
                                                                                                                           
 190 See infra notes 191–211 and accompanying text (arguing that judges should require cy pres 
beneficiary designations in settlement agreements before approval); cf. Yospe, supra note 10, at 1048–
49 (suggesting that judges roles in cy pres distributions should be limited to choosing between com-
peting beneficiaries presented by the litigants). 
 191 See Yospe, supra note 10, at 1048–49 (discussing limiting judges’ roles surrounding cy pres 
distributions as a solution to problems associated with the current level of discretion afforded to judg-
es in the process). 
 192 See infra notes 193–211 and accompanying text (arguing that judges should remove them-
selves, and potential cy pres beneficiaries, from the process of allocating excess settlement funds by 
requiring the parties to agree upon how excess funds will be allocated). 
 193 See In re Lupron, 677 F.3d at 38 (expressing concern about the parties abandoning the process 
of settling how to allocate unclaimed funds, and emphasizing that courts could avoid these concerns 
by requiring the parties to identify cy pres recipients in settlement agreements); PRINCIPLES OF THE 
LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 3.07(c) (2010) (providing that whenever feasible, courts should 
require parties to select a cy pre beneficiary that reasonably approximates the interests of the class). 
Courts and commentators suggest that once a settlement has been reached and there are excess funds, 
the court should require that the parties select a cy pres beneficiary. See In re Lupron, 677 F.3d at 38. 
This Note suggests that the court should instead require the parties to allocate potential unclaimed 
settlement funds prior to approval of any settlement; in other words, the court will not approve a set-
tlement unless there is a plan of disposition for unclaimed funds. See Yospe, supra note 10, at 1055–
56 (suggesting that problems associated with the current unfettered discretion afforded to judges could 
be alleviated if the parties agree on how to distribute these funds prior to the settlement distribution). 
 194 See infra notes 195–211 and accompanying text. 
 195 See supra notes 58–102 and accompanying text (noting that separation of powers issues asso-
ciated with judges making cy pres distributions arise because judges go beyond their constitutionally 
defined sphere of power in making cy pres distributions because they are not resolving a case or con-
troversy). 
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would totally eliminate the potential for appearances of impropriety, as the 
judge would play no role in selecting the beneficiary.196 
Although some courts and commentators have explored settlement 
agreements specifying how unclaimed settlement funds should be distributed, 
it is unclear why this solution has not been widely discussed or adopted.197 
One reason this contractual solution has not been more thoroughly explored 
could be that it is beyond the court’s power to mandate that the parties include 
terms providing for the treatment of unclaimed funds in their settlement 
agreements.198 Rule 23 is clear that the claims of a certified class may be set-
tled only with court approval.199 The rule provides that the court can only ap-
prove a class action settlement that is binding on the class members after a 
hearing in which it determines that the settlement is fair, reasonable, and ade-
quate.200 The policy underlying Rule 23(e)(3) is to ensure that the settlement is 
in the best interests of those class members whose claims against the defendant 
will be extinguished.201 
                                                                                                                           
 196 See Liptack, supra note 105 (noting the potential for appearances of impropriety when judges 
actively participate in the selection of cy pres beneficiaries). This solution would also have two ancil-
lary benefits; first, it would free judicial resources currently being expended in researching and select-
ing charitable organizations for cy pres distributions. See In re Lupron, 677 F.3d at 37–38 (noting that 
having judges research and select cy pres recipients taxes judicial resources). Second, it could facili-
tate settlement by allowing more predictability. See id. 
 197 See Bourlas v. Davis Law Assocs., 237 F.R.D. 345, 356 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (noting that the class 
members and defendant reached a settlement specifically providing for a cy pres distribution of un-
claimed funds to identified cy pres beneficiaries in the settlement agreement); Hopson v. Hanesbrands 
Inc., No. CV-08-0844 EDL, 2009 WL 928133, at * 9–10 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2009) (approving a set-
tlement where the parties agreed that if unclaimed settlement funds were below a certain threshold 
those funds would be distributed to specific charities, even though those charities lacked any substan-
tial nexus to the interests of the class members); see also Yospe, supra note 10, at 1055–56 (discuss-
ing contractual agreements as a mechanism for avoiding problems with unfettered judicial discretion). 
 198 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e) (providing that the claims of a class may only be settled with court 
approval). 
 199 See id.; see also Stanton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 959 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that Rule 23 
prohibits the court from approving a settlement unless it conducts a hearing and concludes that the 
settlement terms are fair, reasonable, and adequate). 
 200 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2). Further, the factors a court may consider in determining whether 
a settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate are consistent across the federal circuits. See, e.g., Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A. Inc., 396 F.3d 96, 117 (2d Cir. 2005) (noting that the established 
factors courts consider in determining whether a proposed settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate 
include: (1) the risk and expenses of future litigation; (2) the reaction of the class to the settlement; 
and (3) the amount of the settlement in relation to the strength of the plaintiffs’ claims); In re Cendant 
Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 232 (3d Cir. 2001) (same); Linney v. Cellular Alaska P’ship, 151 F.3d 
1234, 1242 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that a Rule 23(e)(2) determination requires the balancing of sev-
eral factors including: (1) the strength of the plaintiffs’ case; (2) the risk and expense of further litiga-
tion; (3) the amount of the settlement; and (4) the reaction of class members to the settlement). 
 201 See In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 785 
(3d Cir. 1995) (noting that courts and commentators have uniformly interpreted Rule 23(e)(2) to re-
quire courts to “independently and objectively analyze the evidence and circumstances before it in 
order to determine whether the settlement is in the best interest of those whose claims will be extin-
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The language of Rule 23(e) is unclear as to whether a court may impose 
certain terms on the parties’ settlement to ensure that the settlement fairly, ade-
quately, and reasonably represents the interests of the absent class members.202 
Ideally, the settlement court could use its Rule 23(e) authority to compel the 
parties to reach an agreement about unclaimed settlement funds.203 The idea 
would be that unless the parties agree to disposition of unclaimed funds, the 
settlement would be unfair and inadequately represent the interests of the class 
members because it will inevitably result in costly further proceedings to de-
termine distribution of the unclaimed funds.204 
Rule 23(e) is silent on whether the authority to reject an unfair settlement 
includes the power to impose terms necessary to make that settlement fair, rea-
sonable, and adequate.205 The U.S. Supreme Court, however, has construed 
Rule 23(e) as limiting a court’s power in the settlement process to approval or 
disapproval, and has rejected the proposition that a settlement court may re-
quire the parties to accept a settlement to which they have not agreed.206 A set-
tlement court may, however, advise the litigants that it will not accept a settle-
ment as fair, reasonable, or adequate unless certain terms are deleted or modi-
fied.207 
The practical significance of the Supreme Court’s interpretation of Rule 
23(e) is that a court may not unilaterally impose a provision providing for the 
distribution of unclaimed funds over the objections of the parties, but it may 
tell the litigants that it will not approve a settlement unless they themselves 
agree on a distribution scheme.208 Settlement courts faced with the likely pro-
spect that some of the settlement funds will be unclaimed after distribution to 
                                                                                                                           
guished”) (citation omitted). The court acts as a fiduciary during the settlement approval process, and 
must serve as guardian of the rights of absent class members. See id. (citing Grunin v. Int’l House of 
Pancakes, 513 F.2d 114, 123 (8th Cir. 1975)). 
 202 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(3).  
 203 See id. But see Red Ball Interior Demolition Corp. v. Palmadessa, 173 F.3d 481, 484 (2d Cir. 
1999) (holding that settlement agreements are contracts and that general principles of contract law 
apply); Goldman v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 39 F.3d 402, 405–06 (2d Cir. 1994) (noting that 
settlements are a matter of contract, and general principles of contract law govern settlement agree-
ments). 
 204 See In re Cendant, 264 F.3d at 232 (noting that courts commonly consider the risk and ex-
pense of further litigation in determining whether a settlement meets the Rule 23(e)(2) requirement of 
being fair, reasonable, and adequate). 
 205 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e). 
 206 See Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 726 (1986) (“[T]he power to approve or reject a settlement 
negotiated by the parties before trial does not authorize the court to require the parties to accept a 
settlement to which they have not agreed”). 
 207 See id. 
 208 See id.; see also Jack B. Weinstein & Karin S. Schwartz, Notes from the Cave: Some Problems 
of Judges in Dealing with Class Action Settlements, 163 F.R.D. 369, 376 (1995) (discussing the role of 
judges in shaping class action settlements, and the limitations on a judge’s ability to unilaterally im-
pose settlement terms on the parties). 
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the class members can and should inform the litigants that it will not approve 
the settlement unless they provide for the distribution of these funds.209 
Under this solution, judges would remove themselves from the cy pres 
distribution process by refusing to approve any settlement that does not pro-
vide for the distribution of excess settlement funds.210 The judge could exer-
cise this discretion on the grounds that a settlement that does not provide for 
excess funds will invite further litigation when the inevitable happens and 
funds remain after initial distribution to the class members.211 
CONCLUSION 
The current role judges play in making distributions of unclaimed class action 
settlement funds is concerning for two reasons. First, judges are often forced to 
go beyond their constitutionally defined role as arbiters of cases and controver-
sies by making distributions to uninjured charitable organizations. Second, the 
discretion afforded to judges in this distribution process raises the potential for 
appearances that judges are favoring particular organizations that bear little or no 
relationship to the underlying class. The best way to resolve these issues is to 
remove judges from the process of allocating unclaimed settlement funds. This 
would solve the separation of powers issue because it would obviate the need for 
                                                                                                                           
 209 See Evans, 475 U.S. at 726; see also Bourlas, 237 F.R.D. at 356 (providing an example of a 
settlement agreement that provides for the distribution of excess settlement funds). 
 210 See supra notes 192–193 and accompanying text (noting that judges cannot unilaterally im-
pose settlement terms over the objection of the parties, but can refuse to approve a settlement unless 
the parties themselves agree to modify the agreement). In many instances, the difference between a 
judge unilaterally imposing a term and refusing to approve a settlement unless a term is modified or 
added is somewhat fleeting because such action can often amount to coercion. See Kothe v. Smith, 
771 F.2d 667, 669 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that, although the law favors voluntary settlement, it does 
not sanction efforts by trial judges to effect a settlement through coercion). For example, in a heavily 
negotiated settlement in which the parties are truly motivated to settle, it is unlikely that they would be 
willing to risk the court not approving of a settlement even if they do not agree with the judge’s pro-
posed changes. See Brooks v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 92 F.2d 794, 796 (9th Cir. 1937) (holding 
that a judge must not compel agreement by his or her arbitrary use of his power, and that an attorney 
must not meekly submit to a judge’s suggestion, though it may be strongly urged). In this case, how-
ever, the use of the judge’s power to compel agreement as to allocation of excess settlement funds 
would not be arbitrary, as an agreed upon allocation is necessary to avoid future litigation. See Linney, 
151 F.3d at 1242 (holding that the risk of future litigation is a factor courts may consider in determin-
ing whether a settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate). In many instances the difference between a 
judge unilaterally imposing a term and refusing to approve a settlement unless a term is modified or 
added is somewhat fleeting. See id. This is because a judge’s refusal to approve a settlement unless a 
modification or additional is made can often amount to coercion if the stakes are high enough. See id. 
For example, in a heavily negotiated settlement in which the parties have a lot riding and want to 
settle, it is unlikely that they would be willing to risk the court not approving of a settlement even if 
they do not agree with the judges proposed changes. See id.; see also Redish et al., supra note 3, at 
625 (noting the potential for a court to coercively order distribution of excess settlement funds to 
charitable organizations). 
 211 See Linney, 151 F.3d at 1242 (allowing courts to consider the risk and expense of future litiga-
tion in determining whether a settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate). 
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judges to do more than resolve cases and controversies. Additionally, it would 
solve the potential for appearances of impropriety issue because judges would 
play no role in the distribution of unclaimed funds, so there would no potential 
that judges could be seen as allocating funds to favored organizations. Judges 
can and should do this by refusing to approve settlement agreements that do not 
account for unclaimed settlement funds. Only judges can reign in their own 
power to help maintain the constitutional integrity of Article III courts. 
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